The lights are flashing red in Northern Ireland by Morrow, Duncan
The	lights	are	flashing	red	in	Northern	Ireland
Northern	Ireland	politics	has	been	brought	to	a	standstill	by	a	combination	of	geopolitics	(Brexit)
the	novel	(a	crisis	in	the	Executive	over	alleged	corruption)	and	the	permanent	(sectarianism).
Duncan	Morrow	(Ulster	University)	says	little	is	now	propping	up	Northern	Ireland’s	institutions.
Without	a	Brexit	agreement	and	commitment	to	institutional	reform,	the	current	impasse	already
has	done	real	damage	to	the	relationships	that	keep	Northern	Ireland	afloat.
After	1920,	Northern	Ireland	functioned	something	like	a	‘bad	bank’	for	the	rest	of	Britain	and
Ireland.	The	original	British	government	plan	to	manage	both	sides	in	Ireland	by	sub-dividing	Ireland	within	the	UK
fell	at	the	first	skirmish	with	Irish	nationalism.	But	its	unintended	consequence	was	to	fix	an	administrative	boundary
as	an	international	frontier.	Northern	Ireland	unexpectedly	emerged	as	a	‘unique	region’,	separated	within	Ireland	and
at	arm’s	length	from	Westminster	through	devolution.	Independence	removed	most	Irish	issues	from	everyday	British
politics	and	created	an	unusually	monocultural	26-county	Free	State.	But	Northern	Ireland	was	effectively	isolated	as
a	miniature	interface	of	British-Irish	hostility,	more	of	a	threat	than	an	interest	to	its	neighbouring	capitals.
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In	both	senses	Northern	Ireland’s	tiny	six	counties	‘contained’	conflict:	violence	was	the	risk	which	lurked	around
every	political	corner,	anticipated	before	it	was	visible	–	but	for	as	long	as	violence	was	contained	within	Northern
Ireland’s	physical	and	jurisdictional	boundaries,	its	wider	impact	was	limited,	and	past	tense.	Republicans	and	others
might	protest	against	the	‘failed	statelet’,	but	a	bad	bank	which	parked	active	British-Irish	hostility	in	six	counties
rather	than	two	islands	was	an	outcome	that	both	governments	accepted	as	‘a	price	worth	paying’.	While	Britain	and
Ireland	gradually	charted	a	path	to	a	‘new	normal’	freed	from	everyday	hostility,	antagonism	in	Northern	Ireland
festered	and	regenerated.
Containment	limits	risk	but	does	not	eliminate	it	at	source.	When	divisions	over	civil	rights	led	to	open	confrontation
between	the	Unionist	state	and	protesters,	the	most	striking	aspect	was	the	shockingly	rapid	escalation	to
antagonism	along	ethno-nationalist	lines.	The	archaic	language	of	Catholic-Protestant	sectarianism	and	the	extremity
of	Northern	Ireland’s	rival	nationalisms	allowed	both	Britain	and	Ireland	to	blame	the	crisis	on	the	locals,	but	the
potential	of	toxic	relationships	in	Northern	Ireland	to	reinfect	the	life	of	two	states	was	dramatically	obvious	in
internment,	Bloody	Sunday,	Birmingham	and	Dublin.	Alarmed	at	the	risk	of	being	dragged	back	into	older
confrontations	–	and	with	shared	ambitions	to	enter	the	Common	Market	–	Britain	and	Ireland	co-operated	to
promote	internal	power-sharing	over	ethnonational	supremacy.
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Efforts	to	‘bring	peace’	to	Northern	Ireland	took	a	quarter	of	a	century.	British	state	attempts	to	enforce	order	through
security	and	criminalisation	strained	any	residual	legitimacy	among	nationalists,	while	Ireland’s	constitutional	claim	to
legitimacy	in	Northern	Ireland	and	residual	popular	support	for	anti-imperial	violence	enraged	Unionists.
The	Anglo-Irish	Agreement	of	1985	proved	to	be	the	watershed.	Dublin	and	London	concluded	that	legitimacy	in
Northern	Ireland	required	their	active	partnership.	Implicitly,	containing	violence	would	fail	unless	the	poison	of	zero-
sum	nationalism	within	was	reduced.	‘Reconciliation’	–	meaning	an	agreement	on	the	need	for	a	permanent	‘plural
identity	environment’	in	Northern	Ireland	underpinned	by	an	international	framework	of	values	–	was	the	prerequisite
for	legitimacy	and	any	meaningful	exercise	of	sovereignty.
As	an	effort	at	a	comprehensive	inclusive	framework	to	end	conflict,	the	Good	Friday	Agreement	of	1998	has	no
parallels	in	British-Irish	relations.	Over	more	than	a	decade,	the	governments,	with	active	partners	in	Europe	and
America,	first	confronted	active	opposition	from	Unionists	and	republicans	in	Northern	Ireland	and	then	sponsored
drawn-out	detailed	negotiations	now	known	as	the	‘peace	process.’	The	language	of	reconciliation	and	fresh	start,
commitments	to	the	rule	of	law	and	the	highest	international	standards	of	human	rights,	mutual	acknowledgement	of
tragic	suffering	and	mutually	equal	citizenship	stand	in	stark	contrast	to	everything	that	went	before.
The	signing	of	the	Agreement	also	represented	the	moment	when	responsibility	for	progress	shifted	from
governments	and	international	sponsors,	with	their	strategic	but	time-limited	interest	in	reconciliation,	to	parties	in
Northern	Ireland	and	their	deep	suspicions,	hostilities	and	memories.	The	key	political	instrument	was	a	‘mandatory
coalition’	based	on	guaranteed	proportional	access	to	government.	While	the	governments	moved	to	complete	their
reforms,	including	radical	proposals	on	policing,	the	Northern	Ireland	Assembly	fell	apart	before	it	got	started	on	the
question	of	decommissioning	IRA	weapons.
Reconciliation	appeared	out	of	reach.	Desperate	to	escape	further	entanglement,	Devolution	2.0	was	rebuilt	to
incentivise	devolution	as	a	means	to	stabilise	violence	But	expectations	of	further	reconciliation	were	reduced.
Rhetoric	was	used	to	hide	the	bottom	line	that	containment	had	once	again	become	the	only	essential.	Reconciliation
remained	desirable	–	but	optional.	State	visits	outside	Northern	Ireland	symbolised	progress	everywhere.	Devolution
was	presented	not	simply	as	a	road	to	reconciliation	–	but	AS	reconciliation.
Except	that	it	wasn’t.	The	DUP/Sinn	Fein-led	executive	showed	little	sustained	interest	in	transformational	change.
Integrated	education	was	largely	ignored,	residential	segregation	remained	intact	and	the	peace-walls	still	stood.	In
their	turn,	contentious	issues	from	policing	to	flags	to	language	polarised	or	paralysed	the	Executive.
Now	under	different	political	management	and	facing	their	own	massive	economic	challenges,	the	single	goal	of
British	and	Irish	governments	was	to	ensure	that	they	were	not	dragged	back	into	direct	responsibility	for	the
interminable	sectarianism	of	Northern	Ireland.	For	as	long	as	the	DUP	and	Sinn	Fein	shared	power	and	violence	was
reduced,	containment	was	paramount.	The	task	was	to	reinforce	the	façade	rather	than	fix	the	rotting	timber,	even	if
that	required	eleventh-hour	injections	of	increased	finance	to	avert	collapse.	With	the	mayhem	of	1972	rather	than
the	promise	of	1998	as	the	baseline,	progress	could	ALWAYS	be	demonstrated.	Drawing	attention	to	risks	and
weaknesses	remained	deeply	unpopular.	Despite	disappointing	progress	in	moderating	sectarian	divisions,	Northern
Ireland	was	‘job	done’.
Certainly	almost	nobody	appeared	prepared	for	the	seismic	consequences	of	Brexit	especially	when	it	interacted	with
endemic	sectarianism	and	emergent	nepotism.	Initially	the	impact	appeared	limited.	Voting	took	place	with	what	now
looks	like	remarkable	serenity	and	complacency.	The	collapse	of	the	Executive	was	not	triggered	by	Brexit	but	by	a
furore	over	political	responsibility	for	maladministration	in	a	Renewable	Heating	Initiative	(RHI).	But	the	rapidity	with
which	these	allegations	were	escalated	by	the	parties	first	into	a	crisis	for	the	cross-community	institutions	and	then
into	bitter	sectarian	division	over	the	Irish	language	was	a	warning	sign.	Sinn	Fein’s	withdrawal	from	the	Executive	in
protest	against	DUP	‘arrogance’	was	the	Rubicon.	The	scale	of	Sinn	Fein	gains	in	the	resulting	elections	March	2017
shocked	the	Unionist	electorate	to	the	core.
Talks	to	restore	devolution	remained	gridlocked	over	an	Irish	Language	Act.	But	there	was	unexpected	replay	for	the
DUP	in	June,	when	they	found	themselves	holding	the	balance	of	power	in	Westminster.	With	Sinn	Fein	absent,	the
DUP	was	gifted	an	opportunity	to	block	‘special	status’	for	Northern	Ireland	in	the	EU	negotiations,	limiting	the	British
government’s	capacity	to	reach	accommodation	with	Ireland.	In	the	battle	between	the	Belfast	Agreement	and	hard
Brexit,	the	DUP	came	out	decisively	for	Brexit.
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Clearly,	the	party	valued	this	opportunity	above	any	commitment	to	renewing	power-sharing,	deepening	the	rift
between	Unionism	and	all	other	parties	in	Northern	Ireland.	Relations	strained	further	when	the	DUP	rejected	a
compromise	on	an	Irish	Language	Act	and	talks	on	restoring	devolution	came	to	screeching	halt.	In	the	aftermath,
emboldened	by	shifting	demographics	and	the	electoral	consequences	of	Brexit,	Sinn	Fein	profoundly	alarmed
Unionists	by	shifting	their	priority	to	a	United	Ireland.
For	more	than	600	days,	Northern	Ireland	has	had	no	effective	government	other	than	the	depleting	asset	of	past
administrative	precedent	and	the	thankfully	deep-rooted	consensus	in	Northern	Ireland	that	violence	offers	no
answers.	In	the	absence	of	an	Executive	a	judicial	inquiry	into	the	RHI	scandal	has	filled	the	vacuum.	Every	day,	the
inquiry	has	painstakingly	revealed	political	incompetence,	cultural	corruption	and	lack	of	accountability	in	the
Stormont	system.	If	Brexit	undermined	the	peace	process	from	outside,	the	RHI	drowned	popular	demand	to	restore
the	previous	institutions	in	a	sea	of	cynicism	and	despair.	Northern	Ireland	has	not	so	much	exploded	as	slowly	and
visibly	dissolved.
After	2003,	the	governments	settled	for	devolution	and	containment	without	reconciliation,	as	preferable	to	urging
reconciliation	without	settled	devolution.	Any	dangers	that	the	container	might	break	and	unleash	polarisation,	at	best
or	violence,	at	worst	were	to	be	managed	by	inter-governmental	partnership.	It	is	now	obvious	that	Brexit	has
damaged	all	of	the	structural	safeguards	that	upheld	the	Good	Friday	institutions:	power-sharing,	inter-governmental
co-operation	and	international	solidarity.	The	consequences	of	a	hard	border	for	peace	built	on	a	soft	border
increasingly	came	to	dominate	international	debate.	The	resentment	of	Brexit	supporters	over	the	implications	of	an
Irish	backstop	led	to	increasingly	vitriolic	exchanges	and	the	re-emergence	of	old	prejudices.
None	of	the	key	players	seems	to	have	either	a	route-map	or	commitment	to	a	‘shared	society’,	without	which
Northern	Ireland	returns	inevitably	to	the	politics	of	ethnic	domination.	The	form	of	Brexit	as	it	effects	Northern	Ireland
has	still	not	been	resolved,	but	real	damage	has	already	been	done.	ANY	settlement	may	now	be	seen	by	one	side
as	a	strategic	defeat	with	future	consequences	for	the	stability	of	devolution.	But	the	Brexit	that	is	finally	achieved	will
determine	only	the	starting	point	for	another	wrangle	over	the	future.
RHI	has	revealed	a	cancer	of	unaccountability	within	devolution.	The	devolved	political	structures	will	have	to	be
revisited	if	they	are	to	function	with	credibility.	Both	the	DUP	and	Sinn	Fein	have	radically	different	interpretations	of
the	Agreement	and	have	demonstrated	that	they	regard	a	shared	outcome	in	Northern	Ireland	as	a	goal	to	be	set
aside	at	the	first	opportunity.	The	last	two	years	have	left	a	legacy.
Yet	there	is	little	evidence	of	anything	plausible	to	replace	devolution.	The	direct	alignment	of	the	British	Government
with	one	Northern	Ireland	party	has	made	any	claim	to	neutral	management	through	Direct	Rule	untenable,	while
Brexit	has	so	weakened	partnership	between	Dublin	and	London	that	joint	solutions	seem	implausible.	The	task	of
rebuilding	relationships	starts	from	a	lower	level	than	at	any	time	since	1985.	For	fear	that	the	house	of	cards	might
collapse	in	recrimination,	the	government	has	adopted	a	strategy	of	‘masterly	inactivity’	marked	by	statements	of
startling	banality	from	the	Secretary	of	State,	which	might	be	comic	were	they	not	negligent.
Without	reconciliation	or	government	there	is	no	guarantee	of	containment:	both	Britain	and	Ireland	and	the	parties	in
Northern	Ireland	will	be	entangled	long	after	29	March.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.
Duncan	Morrow	is	a	Professor	in	Politics	at	Ulster	University	and	has	published	widely	in	the	fields	of	conflict
resolution,	Northern	Ireland	politics	and	the	relationship	between	religion	and	politics.
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